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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, I 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 900356-CA 
v. : 
CURTIS GALEN SIMPSON, : Category No, 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from judgment entered upon a jury 
verdict convicting Appellant Curtis Galen Simpson of attempted 
escape, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann, § 
76-8-309 (1990) and Utah Code Ann- § 76-4-101 (1990). 
Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals over the appeal is 
based on Utah Code Ann- § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF DISPOSITIVE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Was defendant denied effective assistance of counsel by 
his trial attorney's requested jury instruction purporting to 
state the elements of attempted escape but instead omitting 
essential statutory elements of the crime? This determination 
presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Templin, 149 
Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Curtis Galen Simpson was charged with escape, 
a violation of Utah Code Ann, § 76-8-309 (1990) (R. 004). The 
statute prohibits "escape from official custody" and makes the 
crime a second degree felony if the actor escapes from 
confinement in the Utah State Prison. A person is deemed to be 
confined in the Utah State Prison "if he has been sentenced and 
committed and the sentence has not been terminated or voided and 
the prisoner is not on parole." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309(3) 
(1990). After a jury trial in the Third Judicial District Court, 
defendant was convicted of attempted escape (R. 0095 at 127; R. 
80)/ a third degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
401 (1990). Defendant was sentenced by the Honorable Pat B. 
Brian to serve a consecutive sentence of not more than five years 
(R. 81). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At trial in May 1990, the State's case-in-chief 
consisted of the following stipulated facts: (1) defendant was 
serving a term in the Utah State Prison of from zero to five 
years for theft, and had not had his sentence terminated and was 
not on parole; (2) defendant missed the 12:00 p.m. count at the 
Orange Street Community Correctional Center on August 7, 1989, 
and could not be located; and (3) approximately eight hours 
later, defendant was picked up by authorities in California (R. 
0095 at 46-47). 
After this stipulation was read to the jury, the State 
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rested (R. 0095 at 47), and defendant took the stand in his own 
defense. He contended that his flight to California was 
justified by compulsion to escape the threats of a Mexican man, 
known to him as Weasel, who had approached him at the Crossroads 
Mall in the first few days of August while defendant was out of 
the Orange Street correctional facility looking for work (R.0095 
at 60-61). Weasel had asked defendant if he was in a halfway 
house and if he had ever testified against "Tiger." Defendant 
denied doing so, and Weasel said he knew better. Weasel said 
defendant would have to come up with $1,000 per month or be 
physically harmed, and defendant ended the encounter by leaving 
(R. 0095 at 61-62). 
While in prison in the spring of 1989, defendant had 
been placed in protective custody by being locked down 24 hours 
a day after expressing his concern to prison officials about his 
physical well-being because of the presence at the prison of 
Danny ("Tiger") Lucero and his gang (R. 0095 at 50-51). 
Defendant had testified against Lucero after Lucero slit 
defendant's throat in 1982 (R. 0095 at 70-72). After his 
complaints to prison officials, defendant was transferred to 
three different facilities within the prison. At the third, he 
was approached by three Mexican men who asked if he knew "Tiger" 
Lucero (R. 0095 at 52). When defendant denied it, the men said 
they knew he had testified against Lucero, and told defendant to 
"watch his back" and that his life was in danger (R. 0095 at 53). 
Defendant was transferred to the Orange Street halfway house in 
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late July 1989, and was approached by Weasel nine or ten days 
later (R, 0095 at 61), 
After his first encounter with Weasel, defendant went 
to a counselor at the halfway house to report the incident. The 
counselor told him to be careful, but that there was nothing he 
could do about it (R. 0095 at 56). On August 7, 1989, defendant 
was approached by Weasel and two other Mexican men while he was 
waiting for a bus to Bountiful (R. 0095 at 56-57). Weasel asked 
if defendant had any money for him, and defendant indicated he 
did not. Defendant got away by boarding his bus while the men 
hollered at him, "We will get you" (R. 0095 at 65). He went to 
his sister's house in Bountiful (R. 0095 at 56-58) to see her and 
her children before his nearby appointment about a job, although 
he had not previously arranged to see her then (R. 0095 at 64). 
He asked for and received money from her and took another bus to 
the Ogden airport and flew to California on the spur of the 
moment, prompted by the confrontation by the three men at the bus 
stop (R. 0095 at 38, 69-70). He claimed that Utah corrections 
officials were not taking care of his well-being and that he did 
not know how to go to them and get help (R. 0095 at 58). 
The State put on Colleen Bay, defendant's half-sister, 
to rebut his assertion that he only impulsively decided to leave 
Utah on the morning of August 7 after the threatening incident at 
the bus stop. Bay testified that he had contacted her some time 
before Friday, August 4, and arranged to come to her home at 
10:00 a.m. on August 7 to pick up his $15,000 inheritance check 
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(R. 0095 at 90-91). After she gave it to him that morning, he 
went to a Centerville bank and obtained $3,000 in cash and the 
balance in a cashier's check (R. 0095 at 94). 
In addition to being instructed on the elements of 
escape and the statutory defense of compulsion in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-2-302 (1990) (Instructions 19, 21-23; R. 64, 66-68), the 
jury was also given Instruction 20 (R. 65) ,l an instruction 
requested by defendant that purported to enumerate the elements 
of attempted escape as: 
1. That on or about the 7th day of August, 
1989, the defendant, CURTIS GALEN SIMPSON, 
was in official custody at the Orange Street 
Community Correctional Center. 
2. That on or about the 7th day of August, 
1989, the defendant attempted to escape from 
such official custody. 
3. That in doing so the defendant acted 
intentionally or knowingly. 
The jury convicted defendant of attempted escape (R. 80). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State does not dispute that the trial court's 
failure to instruct a jury on the elements of the crime of 
attempt, as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1990), is an 
error of federal constitutional dimensions. Although not raised 
by counsel for defendant on appeal2, it is the State's position 
1
 Instructions 19 and 20 are reprinted in Appellant's brief, 
Appendix B. 
2This omission is puzzling since substitute appellate 
counsel was belatedly appointed precisely because of the possible 
existence of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial involving 
the attempted escape elements instruction. Appellant's Motion, 
Stipulation and Order for Extension of Time for Preparation of 
Appellant's Brief (filed January 10, 1991). 
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that trial counsel's submission of the constitutionally deficient 
instruction on the elements of attempted escape constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the sixth 
amendment to the United States Constitution. For this reason, 
defendant's conviction should be reversed and the case remanded 
for new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY ON THE STATUTORY ELEMENTS OF THE 
CRIME OF ATTEMPTED ESCAPE. 
In State v. Harmon, 712 P. 2d 291 (Utah 19.86) (per 
curiam), the Utah Supreme Court held that the trial court erred 
in failing to instruct a jury that an attempt to commit robbery 
included the specific elements of attempt set forth in Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-4-101 (1990), which provides in relevant part: 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is 
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, 
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise 
required for the commission of the offense, 
he engages in conduct constituting a 
substantial step toward commission of the 
offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does 
not constitute a substantial step unless it 
is strongly corroborative of the actor's 
intent to commit the offense. 
In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on its previous 
holding in State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33 (Utah 1980), that it was 
reversible error for the trial court not to instruct on all the 
basic elements of the crime of which the defendant was convicted. 
See also State v. Stewart, 35 Wash. App. 552, 667 P.2d 1139, 1141 
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(1983) (failure to instruct on statutory elements of attempt was 
"error of constitutional magnitude") (cited in Harmon, 712 P.2d 
at 292 n.l).3 
Instruction 20, like the instruction in Harmon, merely 
inserted the words "attempted to" before the words "escape from 
such official custody" that parrot those in the instruction on 
the elements of escape, Instruction 19. Instruction 20 did not 
inform the jury, as Harmon requires, that in order to convict 
defendant of attempted escape it had to find, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, (1) that his conduct constituted a substantial step toward 
commission of the offense of escape, and (2) that the substantial 
step must be strongly corroborative of the defendant's intent to 
commit the primary offense. See Harmon, 712 P.2d at 291-92. The 
State therefore concedes that the instruction on the elements of 
the lesser included offense of attempted escape, Instruction 20, 
is erroneous. 
Counsel for defendant on appeal merely asserts—with no 
citation to supporting authority and no legal argument or 
analysis—that reversal of the conviction in this case is 
required even though there was no objection in the trial court to 
3Although not expressed in the opinions, the constitutional 
error found in Harmon and Stewart apparently flows from the 
holding in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), that, in 
order to satisfy due process, a criminal conviction must be 
supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime. See Chambers v. People, 682 
P.2d 1173, 1175 (Colo. 1984) (en banc). Failure to instruct on 
the basic elements of the crime of which defendant was convicted 
creates the risk that the jury did not make the findings that the 
constitution requires. 
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the unconstitutional omissions in Instruction 20 (Brief of 
Appellant at 5-6). This case does not, however, involve a mere 
failure to object under Rule 19(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. C£. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989). 
It involves the affirmative act of defendant's trial counsel 
submitting Instruction 20 to the court for delivery to the jury. 
In such circumstances, some courts have applied the doctrine of 
invited error and barred a defendant from raising on appeal a 
constitutional challenge to an instruction he proposed. E.g.. 
State v. Tassler, 159 Ariz. 183, 765 P.2d 1007 (1988) (reasonable 
doubt instruction); State v. Henderson, 114 Wash.2d 867, 792 P.2d 
514 (1990) (en banc) (failure to instruct on all elements of 
crime of which convicted); see also People v. Akers, 746 P.2d 
1381 (Colo. App. 1987) (failure to instruct on elements of escape 
where defendant opposed giving of escape instruction and was 
ultimately convicted of attempted escape). 
"The doctrine of invited error is designed to prevent 
an accused from gaining reversal on appeal because of an error 
made by the trial court at his behest." People v. Wickersham, 32 
Cal.3d 307, 650 P.2d 311, 323, 185 Cal.Rptr. 436 (1982); accord 
State v. Prouse, 244 Kan. 292, 767 P.2d 1308 (1989). Thus, if 
defense counsel expressly leads the trial court into error as a 
deliberate tactical move, the defendant cannot complain about the 
error on appeal. Wickersham, 650 P.2d at 325. But where defense 
counsel acts out of neglect or ignorance in requesting an 
erroneous instruction, the doctrine of invited error should not 
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bar an appellate court's consideration of the alleged error. See 
id.; State v. Dozier, 163 W.Va. 192, 195, 255 S.E.2d 552, 555 
(1979). Furthermore, the general rule regarding invited error 
should yield if its application would deprive the accused of his 
constitutional right to due process. State v. Hiqgins, 243 Kan. 
48, 755 P.2d 12 (1988); Dozier, 255 S.E.2d at 555; Henderson, 792 
P.2d at 518-20 (Utter, J., dissenting). 
In the instant case, there was no legitimate tactical 
reason for defense counsel to propose an elements instruction 
that deprived defendant of due process and the record reveals no 
intention by defense counsel to submit the defective instruction 
to gain some strategic advantage at trial. Under these peculiar 
circumstances, where it appears that counsel negligently led the 
trial court to err, it is the State's position that an exception 
to the invited error doctrine is appropriate and the Court should 
not refuse to consider the merits of defendant's constitutional 
challenge to Instruction 20. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE 
HIS COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN PROPOSING AN 
INSTRUCTION THAT OMITTED THE STATUTORY 
ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF ATTEMPTED ESCAPE. 
As noted above, the State concedes it was error for the 
trial court to give an elements instruction for attempted escape 
without providing the elements of an attempt set forth in section 
76-4-101(1) and (2). In light of the fact that the instruction 
was drafted by and requested by defense counsel (Brief of 
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Appellant at 4), it is appropriate to consider whether counsel's 
action in so doing violated defendant's sixth amendment right to 
effective assistance of trial counsel, even though the issue is 
not raised or argued in these terms in Appellant's brief. See 
note 2, supra. 
In order to prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, a 
defendant must show both that counsel rendered deficient 
performance and that prejudice resulted, i.e., if counsel had not 
acted in a deficient manner, there is a reasonable probability of 
a more favorable result for the defendant. State v. Carter/ 776 
P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 118-19 
(Utah 1989). To be judged deficient under the first prong of 
this test, counsel's performance must fall below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment. State v. Templin, 
149 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 16 (Utah 1990); Carter, 776 P.2d at 893. 
Although legitimate strategic choices by an attorney will not 
normally fall beneath this standard of reasonableness, State v. 
Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 
3270 (1990), there is simply no legitimate tactical basis for 
counsel's request of a constitutionally defective elements 
instruction. In light of Harmon, it is uncontrovertible that 
defense counsel's actions in preparing and requesting Instruction 
20 fall below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment. 
With regard to the "prejudice" prong of the test for 
ineffectiveness of counsel, a reasonable probability of a more 
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favorable result for the defendant has been defined as "a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 
Templin, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16 (quoting Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). In this casef the State 
cannot in good faith contend that defendant was not prejudiced by 
his counsel's deficient performance. Defendant did not merely 
leave it to the State to prove the elements of the charge against 
him; he interposed compulsion as a complete defense to the crime 
of escape. See State v. Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630 (Utah 1986) 
(enumerating the common law qualifications on the compulsion 
defense codified in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302 (1990)). 
Notwithstanding defendant's stipulation that on August 
7, 1989, he was serving an unterminated prison sentence and was 
not on parole and that he missed the headcount at the halfway 
house and was picked up in California eight hours later (R. 0095 
at 46-47), the jury found him not guilty of the crime of escape 
but guilty of attempted escape. This verdict does not 
necessarily indicate the jury's complete rejection of defendant's 
compulsion claim. Without an instruction correctly setting forth 
the elements that had to be found by the jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt in order to convict defendant of attempted escape, it is 
reasonably likely that the jury viewed an attempt conviction as a 
permissible compromise choice between the harshness of an escape 
conviction and complete exoneration because of duress. Thus, the 
State believes there is a reasonable probability that the jury 
would have acquitted defendant if properly instructed on the 
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statutory elements of attempt. 
In light of its concession that both prongs of the 
Strickland test for an ineffectiveness claim are met in this 
case, the State agrees that defendant is entitled to a new 
trial/ 
CONCLUSION 
Because defendant was denied his sixth amendment right 
to the effective assistance of counsel at trial, the State 
requests that this Court reverse the judgment of conviction and 
remand for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this f^r? day of April, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
ANNINA M. MITCHELL 
Assistant Attorney General 
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A
 The State therefore considers it unnecessary to address 
the merits of defendant's claim that voir dire was impermissibly 
restricted by the trial court. 
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